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Suspicionless Drug Testing After Skinner and Von

Raab: Constitutional Adjudication in the Courts of
Appeals
Phoebe Weaver Williams*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 21, 1989, the United States Supreme Court announced
two opinions, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n' and
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab.2 Both decisions
address Fourth Amendment challenges to governmental policies
requiring examination of employees' urine to detect the use of
certain prohibited drugs.' The Court in Skinner upheld Federal
Railroad Administration regulations requiring railroad employees
involved in train accidents to submit to blood, urine, and breath
testing. 4 In Von Raab, the Court upheld policies of the United
States Customs Service requiring employees to submit to urine
testing when seeking promotion to positions that involve the interdiction of illegal drugs or the carrying of firearms.' The Court

* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. A.B. 1968, Marquette University; J.D., 1981, Marquette University. The author wishes to express her
appreciation to the following individuals for their editorial comments on earlier drafts of
this Article: Professor Christine Wiseman and Maxine A. White, Esq. She is also grateful
for the research assistance provided by Andrew Shaw and Diana Brooks.
1. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
2. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
3. See U.S. Const. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant,
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Id.; see Phoebe W. Williams, Governmental Drug Testing: Critique and Analysis of Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 21-28 (1990) for a discussion of the
urinalysis process when drug testing is undertaken within a governmental employment
context. Drug testing policies typically require the forced production, collection, and
relinquishment of urine for toxicological examination. Id. at 3. Because the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable governmental intrusions upon individual
privacy, governmental employees have argued that urinalysis testing programs violate the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable governmental searches. Id. at 5-12.
4. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633-34.
5. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 678-79. The policy also requires urine testing for employees
seeking promotions to positions that require the handling of "classified" material. Id. at
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in both cases found that the challenged governmental policies
implicate Fourth Amendment searches; they infringe upon the
employee's reasonable expectations of privacy. However, the Court
permitted the forced testing, even when governmental officials
have no reason to suspect a particular employee of illegal substance
use or work-related misconduct. The Court thus upheld what this
Article refers to as "suspicionless" Fourth Amendment searches
by governmental officials.
Skinner and Von Raab are significant for two reasons. First,
they have been used to clear a path for employment policies6
requiring numerous individuals working in a variety of occupations
and industries to submit to drug testing. 7 Second, the decisions
substantially alter Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. These are the
first cases in which the Court has permitted governmental officials
to search individuals who neither have committed nor are suspected
of committing any crime or work-related misconduct.8
This Article considers whether Skinner and Von Raab articulate
useful analytical rules for courts facing the task of determining
whether a drug testing program is constitutional. 9 Part II concludes
that the Court's opinions do articulate consistent guidelines for
courts to use when deciding whether governmental officials may
proceed with testing without first obtaining a search warrant based
on probable cause. However, while the Court set forth clear and
661. The Court stated that such employees could be required to submit to a urine test,
"especially if the positions covered under this category require background investigations,
medical examinations, or other intrusions that may be expected to diminish their expectations
of privacy in respect of a urinalysis test." Id. at 677. However, the Court concluded it
was unable to assess the reasonableness of the government's testing program with respect
to these employees because it was not clear that the category of employees subject to
testing included only those persons likely to gain access to sensitive information. Id. at
677-78. Therefore, the Court remanded the case for further proceqdings. Id. at 678.
6. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Sullivan, 744 F. Supp. 294, 297
n.7, 305-06 (D.D.C. 1990) (upholding random drug testing for motor vehicle operators and
for positions that hold "top secret" security clearances, including: management analysts;
communication specialists; biological sciences group employees; medical, hospital, dental,
and public health group employees; and security specialists).
7. See Employee Rights and Responsibilities, 6 LAB. LAW. 786, 789-90 (1990) (estimating that 538,000 employees will be affected by Federal Aviation Administration drug
testing rules and three million interstate drivers are covered by Federal Highway Administration drug testing regulations).
8. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Until today this Court
had upheld a bodily search separate from arrest and without individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing only with respect to prison inmates, relying upon the uniquely dangerous
nature of that environment.") (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979)).
9. Cf. Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1989), "[Tlhe Von
Raab majority made no effort to articulate an analytical rule by which legitimate drug
testing programs could be distinguished from the illegitimate ones."), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1056 (1990).
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consistent rules for determining whether warrantless drug testing
violates the Fourth Amendment, it endorsed two very different
standards for determining whether suspicionless drug testing programs are constitutional.
In Skinner the Court considered three factors when determining if
the railroad's suspicionless search regulations were constitutional: (1)
whether the testing policies subject the employee to only a minimal
privacy intrusion; (2) whether the policies advance important governmental objectives; and (3) whether those objectives would be jeopardized by individualized suspicion requirements. 0 Skinner established
this standard in rather absolute terms. As Part III of this Article
demonstrates, however, the federal appellate courts generally have
failed to apply Skinner's standard." Rather, they have engaged in a
process of balancing the particular competing interests implicated by
drug testing programs.12 There are perhaps two explanations for this
development. First, the Court in Skinner did not state explicitly that
it was devising a new set of standards for adjudicating the constitutionality of suspicionless searches. Upon concluding that the challenged drug testing procedure was a Fourth Amendment search, the
Court was forced to develop criteria by which to adjudicate challenges
to such searches. 3 In doing so, however, it did not candidly acknowledge its new constitutional standard; it simply set forth a set of
criteria for evaluating the constitutionality of suspicionless testing
programs.' 4 Second, although the Court in Von Raab purported to
adopt and apply Skinner's standard, it abandoned Skinner's demanding analytical scheme and endorsed instead an ad hoc balancing
approach. 5
In light of the inconsistencies as well as consistencies between

10. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
12. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 945 (1987) (explaining that "It]he metaphor of balancing refers to theories of
constitutional interpretation that are based on the identification, valuation, and comparison
of competing interests"); see also, e.g., infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text. Typically
the competing interests raised by drug testing policies are those governmental interests
offered to justify the testing program which are "weighed" against the resulting infringement
upon individual privacy.
13. Cf. Paul J. Boudreaux, The D.C. Circuit, The War on Drugs, & Harmon v.
Thornberg: A Case Study in Misunderstanding Skinner & Von Raab, 12 GEo. MASON U.
L. REV. 701, 709 (1990) (concluding that upon a determination that persons subject to
urine tests were protected by the Fourth Amendment, the conservative members of the
Court had to "conjure up novel theories of judicially created 'exceptions' to the constitutional protection").
14. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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the Skinner and Von Raab approaches, Part III focuses on two
questions when examining decisions of eight courts of appeals that
have interpreted and applied the Supreme Court's drug testing
decisions: 1) have the appellate courts properly adjudicated the
constitutionality of warrantless drug testing schemes, and 2) have
these courts discerned that Skinner and Von Raab adopted different
standards for adjudicating the constitutionality of suspicionless
testing. Part III also evaluates the quality of balancing performed
by the courts of appeals that have opted to balance competing
interests.
Part IV provides a summary overview of post-Skinner and Von
Raab decisions and concludes that the circuit courts have been
inclined to ignore in many instances, and abbreviate in others, the
analytical framework the Supreme Court used to consider the
constitutionality of warrantless searches. Most courts expand the
generality of the Court's holdings and proceed as if the warrant/
probable cause question was predetermined by the Court's holdings
that no warrant was required for railroad or Customs officials'
use of testing procedures. Part IV also concludes that the courts
of appeals generally have misread Skinner to require only an ad
hoc balancing of interests when deciding the constitutionality of
suspicionless testing. 6 The courts have ignored important constitutional protections and expanded the rationales of Skinner and
Von Raab to justify what appear to be predetermined results. Part
IV suggests that suspicionless drug testing programs should be
evaluated in light of both opinions. After all, Skinner is purported
to provide the precedent for Von Raab.
A threshold issue in each Fourth Amendment challenge to a
drug testing policy should be whether the balancing or nonbalancing adjudicatory method is appropriate. Where balancing is
selected as the appropriate method, on non-balancing courts should
proceed as if the Supreme Court has performed much of the
balancing function by. assigning qualitative values to each of the
interests subject to evaluation. 7 The circuit courts, however, have
viewed the balancing function as a simple evaluation of interests;
determining which interest "outweighs" the other. Skinner and
Von Raab demand a different, more demanding view of the
balancing function, 8 entailing an identification of the competing
interests, against a constitutional standard, and an evaluation of
their particular qualitative values.' 9
16.

See, e.g., infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.

17. Cf. Frank M. Coffin, JudicialBalancing: The Protean Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 16, 27 (1988) (noting that "when a court adopts a heightened scrutiny standard,
it has already done much of the balancing.").
18. See infra notes 56-57, 90-95 and accompanying text.

19.

See Coffin, supra note 17, at 19 (balancing requires more than the simple placement
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It is likely that the Supreme Court intended for the balancing
and non-balancing approaches to peacefully coexist within Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.20 Nevertheless, courts still must distinguish and carefully delineate cases for which balancing is the
appropriate method for constitutional adjudication rather than
proceeding as if balancing is the only constitutional methodology.
This the circuit courts have failed to do. Part IV concludes that
judicial balancing regarding suspicionless testing programs has
radically departed from Fourth Amendment traditions; the judicial
evaluation of the respective interests has been conclusory, reflecting
too much deference to governmental policies, goals, and objectives.
Courts should engage in an exacting review of governmental programs authorizing suspicionless searches.

II.

THE SKINNER AND VON RAAB DECISIONS

A.

Skinner
In Skinner, a divided Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA). 2' These FRA regulations require the testing of the blood,
22
breath, and urine of certain employees involved in train accidents.
Skinner was initiated by the Railway Labor Executives' Association (RLEA), a labor organization representing railroad workers, 23
against the Secretary of Transportation, Samuel K. Skinner. 24 The
RLEA sought to enjoin the FRA from implementing the regulations. 25 A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision
of the district court, and concluded that particularized suspicion
is essential for finding that the toxicological examination of employees' body fluids is reasonable. 26 The Ninth Circuit reasoned

of countervailing weights upon a pair of scales and observing in whose favor there is an
imbalance).
20. See Aleinikoff, supra note 12, at 1003 n.327 (concluding that balancing and nonbalancing approaches exist side-by-side in many areas of constitutional law; citing pairs of
cases decided the same day using balancing and non-balancing approaches: (1) First
Amendment-Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (non-balancing)

and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (balancing); (2) Separation of Powers
Doctrine-Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (balancing)
and Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (non-balancing)).
21. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., Rehnquist, C.J., White, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Scalia, J.J., joined. Stevens, J.,
joined in all but portions of Part III and filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined.).
22. Id. at 609-10.
23. Id. at 612.
24. Id. at 606.
25. Id. at 612.
26. Id.
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that individualized suspicion requirements would ensure that testing
is confined to detection of current impairment rather than discovery
of "the metabolites of various drugs, which are not evidence of
current intoxication and may remain in the body for days or weeks
after the ingestion of the drug." 2 7

On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court recognized
two threshold issues in determining whether the drug testing regulations were even subject to the Fourth Amendment's proscriptions. 28 Upon concluding that they were, the Court proceeded to
consider the constitutionality of the FRA's drug testing regulations. 29
The Court set forth certain legal principles articulating, in part,
the analytical framework it would use to adjudicate the constitutionality of the FRA's regulations.30 The determination that the
railroad's drug testing program implicates a Fourth Amendment
search only begins "the inquiry into the standards governing such
intrusions."'" First, the Fourth Amendment "does not proscribe
32
all searches and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable.
Second, the reasonableness of a search "depends on all the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of
the search or seizure itself." 33 Finally, the "permissibility of a
particular practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests." 3 4 The Court noted, however,
that in most criminal cases this balance is struck in favor of
requiring a search warrant.35 In summary, the Court reaffirmed
the settled constitutional principle that except in certain welldefined circumstances, a search or seizure is not reasonable unless
it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon
probable cause. 6

27. Id. at 613 (quoting Railway Labor Executives' Assn. v. Bunley, 839 F.2d 575,
588-589 (9th Cir. 1988)).
28. Id. at 614. ("Before we consider whether the tests in question are reasonable under

the Fourth Amendment, we must inquire whether the tests are attributable to the Government or its agents, and whether they amount to searches or seizures.") See Williams, supra

note 3, at 34-43 for a discussion of the Court's analysis of these issues.
29. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-21.
30.

Id.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 618-19.
Id. at 619 (citations ommitted).
Id. (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)).
Id. (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
Id.
Id.
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The Court then focused upon the particular standard it would
use to determine the efficacy of requiring governmental adherence
to the Warrant Clause.3 7 There were numerous categories of "welldefined circumstances" potentially available for the Court's consideration.3" The Court, however, selected the "special needs"
exemption as the standard by which it would judge warrantless
searches. 39

37. Id.
38. See Williams, supra note 3, at 50 n.312 (enumerating the classes of cases that
recognize exceptions to warrant requirement).
39. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619. The "special needs" exemption to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement was initially articulated by Justice Blackmun in his concurring
opinion to New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985). T.L.O. addresses the Fourth
Amendment challenge to the warrantless search of a high school student's purse, based on
a suspicion that she had violated the school's prohibition against smoking cigarettes in a
nonsmoking area. The student moved to suppress evidence recovered in the search and her
confession that she was using and dealing marijuana, claiming the search violated her
Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 328-29. Recognizing the Fourth Amendment's mandate
that searches must be reasonable, the Court stated that the determination of reasonableness
requires "balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails." Id.
at 337.
While concurring with the Court's judgment, Justice Blackmun reasoned that the Court
had omitted a step by immediately resorting to a balancing of governmental and private
interests to decide if the public interest was best served by a lesser standard than probable
cause. Id. at 351. He thought that the Court had used the balancing test only when
confronted with a "special law enforcement need for greater flexibility," which he phrased
the "special needs" exemption. Id. Only in "those exceptional circumstances in which
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probablecause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests
for that of the Framers." Id. Justice Blackmun was particularly troubled that the balancing
test would become the rule for constitutional adjudication rather than the exception. Id.
at 352. He agreed with the Court's judgment in T.L.O., however, because in his view a
"special need" was present. Id. at S53.
The "special needs" concept was rearticulated by Justice O'Connor when writing for the
plurality in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987). Relying on Justice Blackmun's
reasoning in T.L.O., Justice O'Connor expressed the opinion that a warrant requirement
would unduly burden the employer who wished to enter an employee's office, desk, or file
cabinets, in order to search for a work-related purpose. Id. at 722. However, Justice
Blackmun dissented and concluded that the search in question was "investigatory" in
nature. Id. at 732. According to Justice Blackmun, there was no "special need." Id.
The criteria for applying the "special needs" exemption were refined in New York v.
Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun focused upon specific
criteria rather than a balancing of competing interests when determining "whether the
warrantless search of an automobile junkyard, conducted pursuant to a statute authorizing
such a search, falls within the exception to the warrant requirement for administrative
inspections of pervasively regulated industries." Id. at 693. Initially describing the "special
needs" exemption with reference to a balancing function, Justice Blackmun indicated that
"special needs" may exist "where the privacy interests of the owner are weakened and the
government interests in regulating particular businesses are concomitantly heightened." Id.
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As stated by the Court, warrantless searches are appropriate,
"when 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.' "40 Citing several decisions where "special needs" had
provided an exemption, the Court stated that previously it had
not "hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy interests
to assess the practicality of the warrant
and probable cause re4
quirements in the particular context." '
Several points should be noted regarding the Court's articulation
and use of the "special needs" exemption. Skinner contemplates
balancing competing interests when determining the constitutionality of warrantless drug testing or, if no warrant is required,
testing undertaken without probable cause. 42 Balancing is neither
used to determine whether the government could undertake suspicionless drug testing nor whether the Fourth Amendment would

at 702. However, when applying the "special needs" exemption, the Court considered this
warrantless search reasonable because three criteria were met: (1) there was a "substantial"
governmental interest which informed the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection was made; (2) the warrantless inspections were necessary to further the regulatory
scheme; (3) the statute's inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its
application, provided a constitutionally adequate substitute for the warrant. Id. at 702-03,
708-12.
The "special needs" exemption surfaced again in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868
(1987). Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia used the "special needs" exemption to
uphold the warrantless search of a probationer's home by state authorities. Id. at 875-76.
Identifying the supervision of probationers as a "special need," the Court noted that the
state regulation, as interpreted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, required the probation
officer to have reasonable grounds to believe the probationer may have violated the terms
of his probation. Id. at 876. Reluctantly, accepting Wisconsin's conclusions as to the
presence of "reasonable grounds," the Supreme Court agreed that the special needs of
Wisconsin's probation system made the warrant requirement impracticable. Id. at 875-76.
The Court's "special needs" examination revolved around three considerations: (1) the
"appreciable degree" the warrant requirement would interfere with the probation system;
(2) the "delay inherent in obtaining a warrant"; and (3) the reduced effectiveness of
expeditious searches to deter probation violations. Id. at 876.
Justice Blackmun dissented reasoning that the presence of special law enforcement needs
justified resorting to a balancing test, but did not "preordain the necessity of recognizing
exceptions to the warrant and probable-cause requirements." Id. at 881. His application
of a balancing test would lead to the conclusion that special law enforcement needs would
justify a search of the probationer's home on the basis of a reduced level of suspicion. Id.
at 882. However, this necessity for supervision would not justify an exception to the
warrant requirement. Id. In other words Justice Blackmun would bifurcate the analysis of
the probable cause warrant requirement so that the level of suspicion could be reduced but
the safeguards associated with the warrant would remain. See also State v. Griffin, 388
N.W.2d 535, 544-45 (Wis. 1986) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting), aff'd, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)).
40. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351).
41. Id.
42. Id.
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allow governmental officials to search when they have some level
of suspicion lower than probable cause, such as reasonable suspicion. 43 Further, balancing decides the constitutionality of warrantless drug testing only for a "particular context"; focusing
upon the circumstances peculiar to the drug testing program and
the governmental employer. 44 Skinner, therefore, does not suggest
that its holding should form the basis for the universal constitutional principle that employment drug testing is never subject to
the warrant provision of the Fourth Amendment.
The "special need" identified in Skinner is the governmental
interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure
safety. 45 The objective of gathering and preserving evidence after
a train accident was deemed a special need, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, even though the samples could be made
available to law enforcement authorities. 46 Note, however, that
before the Court would assess the FRA testing program in a light
other than its administrative purpose, it would require a demonstration that the administrative scheme was designed to serve as a
"pretext" for law enforcement authorities to gather evidence of
penal law violations.4 7
The Court's articulation of the "special needs" standard leads
one to expect that the next step is a balancing analysis of this
special need in light of the impracticality of requiring adherence
to the Warrant Clause. The Skinner Court, however, applied
analyses developed in earlier decisions such as Camara v. Municipal
49
Court8 and Schmerber v. California.
Relying on Camara, Skinner considers what, if any, additional
protections a warrant might afford employees subject to the search,
and whether warrant requirements would frustrate the government's ability to accomplish its legitimate objectives.50 The Court
found that the FRA regulations sufficiently advised employees of
the permissible limits of the authorized intrusion and sufficiently
limited officials' discretion when performing the search; therefore,

43. Id. Likewise the "special needs" cases cited by Skinner involve searches where
governmental officials had some suspicion that the individual searched had violated certain
rules or regulations; those cases, therefore, only consider the constitutionality of warrantless
searches or searches based on a suspicion of less than probable cause. See supra note 39
for a discussion of those cases.
44. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
45. Id. at 620.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 621 n.5.
48. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
49. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
50. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622-23.
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the Court found a warrant "would do little" to protect the privacy
interests of the railroad employees." Further, "[i]mposing unwieldy
warrant procedures ... upon supervisors, who would otherwise
have no reason to be familiar with such procedures, is simply
unreasonable. '5 2 Finally, Skinner considers whether the warrant
requirements would "frustrate the governmental purpose behind
the search." 53 Analogizing urine testing to the warrantless blood
alcohol testing upheld in Schmerber, the Court reasoned that delays
associated with procuring a warrant could result in the destruction
of valuable evidence, and thus
would frustrate the governmental
54
purposes behind the search.
Having dispensed with the need for a warrant, the Court gave
brief consideration to whether the government should be required
to have probable cause. Analysis of the need for probable cause
was subsumed in the Court's discussion addressing the constitutionality of the testing which, according to railroad regulations,
would proceed without any individualized suspicion of drug use
or impairment.55
It was in considering the constitutionality of a drug testing
scheme which requires no warrant, probable cause, or individualized suspicion, that the Court set forth a newly fashioned doctrine
for judging the constitutionality of suspicionless searches:
In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the
search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest
furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement
of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the
absence of such suspicion.,,

This language and the Court's subsequent analysis support the
conclusion that adjudication of the constitutionality of suspicionless searches involves the following inquiry: (1) whether the search
implicates minimal privacy interests (a minimal search); (2) whether
the search furthers or advances important governmental interests;
and (3) whether individualized suspicion requirements would jeopardize important governmental interests. 7 Each of these questions
must be answered affirmatively for a constitutional search.
As to the first factor, the Court concluded that the railroad's
use of urinalysis to detect drug use implicated minimal privacy
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.at 622.

57.

Id.

Id. at 623-24 (quoting O'Conner v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987)).
Id. at 623.
Id.
Id. at 624.
Id.
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interests.5" The extent to which this testing intrudes upon individual
privacy interests is examined from two vantage points: the seriousness of the invasions associated with the government's intrusion59
and the strengths of the interests associated with the individual's
expectations of privacy.6
As to the third factor, the Court concluded that individualized
suspicion requirements would indeed jeopardize important governmental interests. It characterized the privacy interests implicated
by the testing as minimal and the governmental interest in testing
without a showing of individualized suspicion as compelling. 6'
These conclusions were supported with several rationales which
center around the assumption that railroad officials would not be
able to form an individualized suspicion in a manner which would
permit timely and accurate detection of dangerously impaired
employees. The Court found that the employees subject to testing
may cause great human loss if impaired and that such losses can
occur before any signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors or others. 62 The scenes after major railway accidents are
often "chaotic"; thus, requiring railroads to obtain evidence of
individual suspicion in such circumstances would be "unrealistic,
and inimical to the governmental goal of assuring safe rail transportation. "63 Individualized suspicion requirements, therefore, would
jeopardize accomplishment of governmental objectives.
Finally, the Court considered the second and most troublesome
inquiry: whether urinalysis testing furthered the governmental goal
of safe railway transportation.6 The Court stated that it did, in
two ways. First, suspicionless drug testing policies further the
governmental goal of safe transportation because they deter employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks from using controlled
substances or alcohol in the first place. 65 Six members of the Court
agreed that the unpredictability of post-accident testing significantly

58.

Id. at 628.

59. Id. at 627-28.
60. Id. at 626-27.
61. Id. at 628 (characterizing this interest as "compelling" although an "important"
interest would have sufficed under the language used in articulating the Court's third
factor).
62. Id.at 628-29.
63. Id. at 631.
64. Id. at 629-30; cf. id. at 634 (Stevens, J., concurring) (accepting the accident
inspection rationale, and rejecting the majority's deterrence reasoning).
65. Id. at 629-30.
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increased the deterrent effect of administrative penalties for onthe-job drug use. 66 Second, the testing policies further the governmental goal of preventing railroad accidents because the test results
will help railroads obtain invaluable information about the causes
of major accidents and 67assist in developing appropriate measures
to safeguard the public.
In conclusion, the Court announced that the government may
take all necessary and reasonable regulatory steps to prevent and
deter hazardous conditions which can stem from employees' performances of certain functions while concealing drugs in their
bodies. 68 The FRA had demonstrated both the reasonableness and
necessity for its regulations.69
Von Raab
In Von Raab, the Court, in a closely divided opinion, upheld
the Fourth Amendment constitutionality of the United States Customs Service policy requiring urinalysis to ascertain drug use by70
employees seeking transfers or promotions to certain positions.
The testing scheme in Von Raab is governed by United States
Department of Health and Human Services drug testing regulations.7
The Von Raab litigation was initiated by a union and a union
official, both representing certain individuals employed by the
Customs Service, against the Commissioner of the Service, William
Von Raab. 72 The National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU)
contended that the Customs Service drug testing program violates
the Fourth Amendment and sought injunctive relief." The District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana enjoined the drug
testing, holding that while there existed legitimate governmental
work force, the drug testing plan
interests for having a drug-free
'7 4
was "overly intrusive."
B.

66. Id.
67. Id. at 630.
68. Id. at 633.
69. Id.
70. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (5-4
decision) (Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and
White, Blackmun and O'Connor, J.J., joined; Marshall, J., dissented in which Brennan,
J., joined; Scalia, J., dissented joined by Stevens, J.).
71. Id.at 661 n.l.

72.

Id.at 660, 663.

73. Id.at 663; see National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp.
380 (E.D. La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
74. Id. (quoting Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. at 387) (finding the policy permitted searches
and seizures "without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, in violation of legitimate
expectations of privacy").
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A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding the
searches associated with the drug testing policy were reasonable. 75
In the court's view, the Customs Service minimized the intrusiveness of the search "by not requiring visual observationof the act
of urination and by affording notice to the employee that he will
be tested." '7 6 Further, the court found that the government has a
strong interest in detecting drug use among Custom Service employees because such use raises substantial doubts as to the employees' ability to honestly and vigorously discharge their dutiesthus undermining public confidence in the integrity of the Service
77
and impairing the Service's efforts in enforcing drug laws.
The Supreme Court in Von Raab concluded that drug testing
regulations implicated Fourth Amendment searches. 78 Like Skinner,
Von Raab sets forth certain legal principles; however, purporting
to have assessed prior Supreme Court precedent, Von Raab announced that it was reaffirming "the long standing principle that
neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure
of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of
reasonableness in every circumstance. ' 79 The Court then considered
the constitutionality of the Customs Service officials' warrantless
searches.
As in Skinner, the Supreme Court in Von Raab relied upon the
"special needs" exemption to adjudicate the constitutionality of
the Customs Service's drug testing policy.8 0 Von Raab, however,
articulates a significantly different "special needs" exemption than
that set forth in Skinner. According to Von Raab, "where a
Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to
balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a
warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular
context. 8 1 Under Von Raab's articulation of the "special needs"
standard, the balancing result determines the necessity for not only
a warrant or probable cause but also any level of individualized

75. Id. at 663 (citing Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 170).
76. Id. at 663-64 (citing Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 177).
77. Id. (citing Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 178). According to the Fifth Circuit, employees
using illicit drugs are susceptible to bribery and blackmail, can be tempted to divert portions
of undetected drug shipments for their own use, and may endanger the safety of themselves
and their fellow agents if they carry firearms.
78. Id. at 665.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 665-66 (emphasis added).
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suspicion. The constitutionality of the suspicionless searches is not
determined by the tri-factor inquiry posed in Skinner; instead the
"special needs" balancing process, previously used only in determining the constitutionality of warrantless testing, also determines
the constitutionality of the suspicionless testing. The special needs
exemption thus was extended from warrantless to suspicionless
searches.
Applying the "special needs" concept, the Court in Von Raab
concluded that it was clear the Customs Service's drug testing
program was designed to deter drug use among those employees
eligible for promotion to sensitive positions within the Service, and
not to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement.8 2 The test
results cannot be used for criminal prosecution without employees'
consent.83
Rather than undertaking balancing at this point, however, the
Court, consistent with its approach in Skinner, considered warrant
requirements in light of the Camara analytical framework.14 The
Court concluded that warrant requirements would burden governmental objectives because, even if Customs Service officials are
more familiar with warrant procedures than, for instance, railroad
officials, requiring a warrant in this context would serve only to
divert valuable agency resources from the Service's primary mission.8" Furthermore, a warrant would provide employees with little
or no additional protections against invasions upon their personal
privacy.8 6 Employees are not subject "to the discretion of the
official in the field" because the regulations narrowly and specifically define the circumstances for testing. 7 Moreover, in the view
of the Court, the employees do not need a warrant to be advised
of the lawful limits of the search: the published regulations are
undoubtedly well known to covered employees.8 8
As in Skinner, the Court gave perfunctory consideration to the
probable cause requirement. Analogizing the drug testing searches
to routine administrative searches, the Court considered the probable-cause standard "unhelpful" in accomplishing governmental
objectives of preventing hazardous conditions and detecting pos-

82. Id. at 666.
83. Id.
84. Id. The Court's view that it was necessary to discuss the warrant requirement issue
further supports the position that Skinner did not decide the issue for all governmental
employment drug testing.
85. Id. at 666-67.
86. Id. at 667.
87. Id.(quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967)).
88. Id.
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747

sible violators. These governmental goals are accomplished under
circumstances that rarely generate articulable grounds for personal
searches.89

Referring to Skinner, the Court articulated the parameters of
constitutional suspicionless drug testing programs: "Our precedents
have settled that, in certain limited circumstances, the Government's need to discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to
prevent their development, is sufficiently compelling to justify the
intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such searches without
any measure of individualized suspicion."9° This language purports
to be an abbreviated articulation of Skinner's holding. Yet while
Von Raab suggests that Skinner's concepts govern its examination
of the constitutionality of suspicionless testing programs, the Court's
earlier "special needs" articulation had already committed it to
using a balancing test. 91

However, Von Raab's language does provide some insight into
how balancing should be undertaken. The Court's statement that
the governmental interests must be sufficiently "compelling" suggests that the Court assigned a weight of "compelling" to the
governmental interest in question thus resulting in a decision in
the government's favor. Under Skinner's inquiry, the weight assigned to the governmental interest need only be "important." 92
Further, the Court's reference to the government's need to discover
or prevent the development of latent, hidden conditions suggests
that a governmental interest which is of a particular character
must be present to justify suspicionless testing. In other words,
there must be a compelling governmental interest in detecting and
preventing drug use by persons who otherwise would not manifest
articulable grounds for forming a reasonable suspicion and whose
drug impaired functioning could create hazardous conditions for
the public.
One could read Von Raab as endorsing substantial intrusions
upon privacy interests by governmental officials as long as those
privacy interests are outweighed by countervailing "compelling"
governmental interests. 93 In contrast to Skinner, Von Raab does
not expressly require that the drug testing entail only minimal
intrusions upon privacy interests.94 Acceptance of this view of Von
Raab leads to the conclusion that the Court accepted a suspicionless

89.

Id. at 668.

90.

Id.

91.
92.
93.
94.

See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668-70.
Id.
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search standard that is considerably less demanding than that
endorsed in Skinner; compelling governmental interests in discovering latent or hidden conditions could arguably outweigh substantial intrusions upon privacy. Whether Von Raab assigned a
particular qualitative value to those privacy interests that would
succumb to suspicionless testing is unclear from the Court's articulation of the "special needs" examination. The balancing of
interests, as articulated with respect to the "special needs" examination, assigns no particular qualitative values to either the
governmental interests or the privacy intrusions. Interpreting Von
Raab in this fashion permits a simple balancing of countervailing
interests to determine the constitutionality of suspicionless searches,
ignoring the significant constraints placed upon the use of suspicionless searches in Skinner. It is more likely that by endorsing a
balancing examination, the Supreme Court expected that the balancing process would be subject to a heightened judicial scrutinysomething more than the simple consideration of which interest
"outweighs" the other. It is more reasonable to assume that the
Court in Von Raab struck the constitutional balance that must be
achieved to support suspicionless testing. 95 The governmental interest must be of a particular character-compelling-and the
intrusion must implicate only minimal privacy interests.
When balancing competing interests, the Von Raab Court recognized "the veritable national crises in law enforcement caused
by the smuggling of illicit narcotics." 96 Expounding upon the
deceptiveness and the violent tendencies of drug traffickers, the
Court concluded that the government has a "compelling interest
in ensuring that front-line interdiction personnel are physically fit,
and have unimpeachable integrity and judgment." 97 The "Drug
War" and all the problems associated with drug trafficking were
placed on the governmental interest side of the balancing scale,

95. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985). Justice White wrote:
We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the
reasonableness standard we adopt for searches by school authorities. In other
contexts, however, we have held that although "some quantum of individualized
suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure[,] . . . the
Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion."
Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are generally appropriate
only where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal and where
"other safeguards" are available "to assure that the individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy is not 'subject to the discretion of the official in the
field.' " (citations omitted).
96. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531, 538 (1985)).
97. Id. at 670.
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thus creating a compelling legitimate governmental interest. The
Supreme Court in Von Raab also noted the judicial deference
previously afforded government officials when compelling national
security interests were at stake. 9 National interests could be irreparably damaged if Customs Service employees' drug use rendered
them unsympathetic to their mission of interdicting narcotics. 99
Likewise, these same public interest concerns justify preventing
promotion of drug users to positions that require the use of deadly
force.100 Employees authorized to use deadly force were analogized
to the railway crew members in Skinner because both groups
discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that
even momentary lapses of attention may produce disastrous consequences. 101
The Court considered these public interests in light of the
interference with individual privacy that results from the Customs
Service's urine testing procedures. As in Skinner, the Court considered employees' privacy interests from two vantage points. First,
employees' expectations of privacy were deemed diminished by
virtue of previous inquiries into their "trustworthiness and probity. '"102 Second, governmental intrusions were deemed minimal
since regulatory procedures provided employees advance notice of
the testing, required no direct observation of urination, limited the
toxicological examination to specific drugs, and only required
personal medical information disclosure by those employees who
tested positive. 03
The Court rejected arguments raised by the union that the testing
was unnecessary to further the governmental goals.'04 The absence
of this factor likely would have been dispositive in Skinner, but
under the Von Raab balancing examination, the "possible harm"
which the government seeks to prevent furnishes ample justification
for searches "calculated" to advance the government's goal. 10 5

98. Id. (discussing cases in which courts upheld suspicionless searches of travelers
entering the country).
99. Id.

100.

Id.

101. Id. at 670-71.
102. Id.at 671.
103. Id.at 672-73 n.2; see also Edward M. Chen et al. Common Law Privacy: A Limit
on an Employer's Power to Test for Drugs, 12 GEo. MAsoN U. L. REv. 651, 691-92 (1990)
(contrasting the intrusiveness of the Von Raab testing with a random testing scheme and
noting that Von Raab upheld a one-time test initiated only upon the employee's application
for promotion and her final selection for the position).
104. Id. at 673.
105. Id. at 674-75; cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985) ("Such a search
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Unlike Skinner, Von Raab does not require the government to

prove the search demonstrably advances its efforts to address
identified governmental concerns. 1°6 Von Raab endorses searches
that are only calculated to prevent possible societal harms. 107 On

this point, Von Raab significantly departs from the Skinner criteria
because the factual predicate necessary to demonstrate the government's compelling interest is only the prevention of "possible
harms" rather than the necessity of addressing identified prob-

lems.10 Additionally, the Court required no extensive tailoring of
the search to address these harms; the testing need only be "calculated" to address governmental objectives. 1°9 These differences
in the relationship between the governmental goals to be achieved

by drug testing, and the existence of actual problems to be addressed by a drug testing policy, were dispositive for two members
of the Court." 0
In contrast to Skinner, urinalysis testing in Von Raab is declared

to be reasonable, not "necessary.""' The Court concluded that
the government "has demonstrated its compelling interests in safeguarding our borders and the public safety outweigh the privacy
expectations of employees who seek to be promoted to positions
which involve the interdiction of illegal drugs or that require the

incumbent to carry a firearm. ' "
III.

2

JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE SKINNER
ADJUDICATORY METHODS

AND VON RAAB

A.

The Courts of Appeals
Generally, the federal circuit courts have balanced the interests
of the government against the resulting privacy infringements when

will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the
objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the
student and the nature of the infraction."); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987)
(holding that warrantless inspections must be necessary to further the regulatory scheme).
106. Id.
107. Id.at 675-76 n.3.
108. Id.at 674-75.
109. Id.
110. Id.at 680-81 (Scalia and Stevens, J.J., dissenting) (declining to join in the Court's
opinion in Von Raab because "neither [the] frequency of use nor connection to harm is
demonstrated or even likely"). In light of his previous position in Burger, one would have
expected Justice Blackmun to join the dissenting justices. See supra note 39. Had Justice
Blackmun adhered to his previous position, the outcome of the Von Raab decision would
have been different.
111. Id. at 677.
112. Id.
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examining the constitutionality of various drug testing policies." 3

Adopting the balancing approach articulated in Von Raab's "special needs" examination, the courts rarely refer to the analogical
reasoning employed in Skinner. 1 4 They generally ignore the absolute standards advanced in Skinner, applying instead a facile
approach to balancing, the focus of which is solely to decide which
interest "outweighs" the other." 5 They have consistently rejected
attempts by proponents through argument
to even engage in Skin16
ner's more exacting examination.
Additionally, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Von Raab invites
consideration of whether the circuit courts have discerned the need
to assess the particular "weight" of competing interests. This
Article concludes that Von Raab requires that the governmental
interest reach a "compelling" level of concern, and even then a
''compelling" interest may offset no greater than a "minimal"
intrusion. The rationales and decisions of the courts of appeals
suggest they instead have conceived their task as one requiring
only the comparison of competing interests to determine which
interest outweighs the other rather than a qualitative assessment
of interests against a constitutional standard.
B.

Decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit Court

The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia (the D.C. Circuit)
issued the first federal appellate level decision after Skinner and
Von Raab,"7 and has addressed more drug testing challenges than
any other circuit." 8 Thus, comparison of the jurisprudence of this

113. See, e.g., Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 488, 493-96 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
cert. denied; 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
114. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 12,
at 945 (distinguishing balancing as an adjudicatory method from methods of adjudication
that look at a variety of factors when reaching a decision).
115. Balancing, however, does not have to be facile. It can be detailed, careful, and
open. See, Coffin, supra note 17, at 22-25.
116. See, e.g., infra notes 124-28 and accompanying text. The use of a balancing
methodology to decide Fourth Amendment issues, however, has strong support in precedent.
See Alienikoff, supra note 12, at 965 (noting the growth and spread of balancing methodology, the author states the "Court has stated and restated the balancing of 'competing
interests' is 'the key principle of the Fourth Amendment' ") (citations omitted).
117. See Boudreaux supra note 13, at 701 (characterizing Harmon as the "first major
drug testing ruling" after the Supreme Court's holdings in Skinner and Von Raab).
118. Id. at 701-02 n.12 (observing that the D.C. Circuit is often called the "second
most" important court in the nation and concluding that the court's jurisdiction over most
regulatory and administrative decisions of federal agencies has an "outsized" impact on
the nation's governmental policies).
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circuit with that of other circuits permits some assessment of the
evolution of drug testing jurisprudence.
1. Harmon v. Thornburgh
The D.C. Circuit expressed an early preference for the Von
Raab balancing approach. In Harmon v. Thornburgh, issued shortly
after Skinner and Von Raab, a panel of the D.C. Circuit upheld
the constitutionality of the Department of Justice's drug testing
program by balancing the governmental interests at stake against
the resulting intrusion upon privacy caused by the use of urinalysis." 9 The Harmon drug testing policy applies to federal prose-

cutors, workers with access to grand jury proceedings, and
employees holding top secret national security clearances. 20 Relying

on Von Raab, the court concluded that testing employees holding
top secret national
security clearances does not violate the Fourth
1 21
Amendment.
Arguably the court's reliance upon Von Raab should not be
viewed as a preference for a balancing methodology over any other
22
adjudicatory approach; rather, the court distinguished Skinner1
and concluded that Von Raab was more on point. However, the
court's rationale reveals that its decision to apply a balancing test
was based upon the misconception that both Skinner and Von
Raab used balancing
to adjudicate the constitutionality of suspi23
cionless searches. 1
Articulating the "special needs" language used in Von Raab,
Harmon applies a balancing test to determine the constitutionality
of both the warrantless and suspicionless elements of the searches
associated with the drug testing program. When balancing, Harmon
does not consider whether the testing policies entail only minimal,

119. 878 F.2d 484, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
120. Id. (concluding that employees holding top secret national security clearances could
be subjected to mandatory suspicionless testing). The court suggested that workers per-

forming duties closely tied to the enforcement of federal drug laws could constitutionally
be required to undergo testing but refused to delineate which employees within existing
governmental categories could be tested where the government had not drawn such lines.

Id. at 493-96.
121. Id. at 493.
122. Id. at 488 (distinguishing Skinner because the post-accident drug testing was
contingent upon an event, a train accident or rule violation, and suggesting that the event
provided an indication that there had been some dereliction of duty or that things had not
gone as planned). The court noted that "Skinner relied entirely upon a single governmental
interest: the protection of the public from immediate threats to physical safety." Id.
123. Id. (concluding that both Skinner and Von Raab used balancing to determine the
constitutionality of suspicionless searches).
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rather than more substantial, intrusions.'24 Evaluation of the nature
and extent of the intrusion should have been one of the court's
threshold issues because the Supreme Court endorsed suspicionless
searches only where the testing policies cause minimal intrusion
upon employees' reasonable expectations of privacy.' 25 Instead of
assessing the qualitative intrusiveness of the search, Harmon simply
dismisses the employees' arguments that the randomness of the
testing increases its intrusiveness beyond that endorsed in Von
Raab. 126 The court believed that even if the random testing increased the privacy intrusion, such increased intrusion is only a
relevant, not dispositive, consideration.' 27 Harmon misinterprets
the importance of the increased intrusion, however, if one agrees
that the balancing test within the context of suspicionless drug
testing involves more than deciding which competing interest "outweighs" the other, but instead requires an examination of competing interests to determine
if they meet predetermined, prescribed
12
qualitative values.

Harmon's balancing approach does not require the government
to establish that the search advances the governmental interest, an
important consideration in Skinner. 29 Further, there is no need
for the government to prove that individual suspicion requirements
would jeopardize accomplishment of the governmental objectives,
another factor considered in Skinner.13 0 Harmon rejects arguments
by the employees that Von Raab must be distinguished because
the government is able to detect drug-impaired Justice Department
employees who work in traditional office settings. 3 ' This distinction was considered to be only "one element to be weighed in the
balance.'1

2

According to the Harmon court, "the Von Raab Court

124. Id. at 492. See also Boudreaux, supra note 13, at 704 (concluding that the court's
rationale was "nonexistent").
125. See supra notes 58-60, 103 and accompanying text.
126. Harmon, 878 F.2d at 489 (employees arguing that random testing involves a greater
intrusion than that approved in Von Raab). While the court acknowledged that a "coherent
theory" could be constructed that the randomness of the drug testing program at issue
would provide a fundamental distinction, the court concluded that Von Raab does not
require that the search only involve a minimal intrusion. Id. But see supra note 103 and
accompanying text. The extent of the intrusion would only affect the outcome in a
particularly close case where that factor might tip the scales in favor of the employee.
Harmon, 878 F.2d at 489.
127. Id. at 492.
128. See Boudreaux, supra note 13, at 703-05 (criticizing the court's analysis of the
extent to which random testing intrudes upon employees' privacy interests).
129. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
130. Harmon, 878 F.2d at 492.
131. Id. at 489.
132. Id.
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gave no indication that it deemed this factor to be one of overriding
significance."' 33 Yet, the reasoning of Von Raab suggests otherwise. 134
The trend toward an expanded level of generality given to the
Supreme Court's Skinner and Von Raab holdings surfaced in
Harmon.'35 Because Harmon lacked any analysis of the constitutionality of warrantless testing, one may assume the court interpreted the Supreme Court's findings that the Skinner and Von
Raab governmental employers were exempt from warrant/probable
cause requirements as a determination that all warrantless governmental drug testing programs were constitutional. Yet the Court
gave no indication that its holdings should be elevated to. constitutional principles.
When addressing the warrant issue, the Supreme Court in Skinner and Von Raab engaged in ad hoc decision making. 3 6 If the
Supreme Court had attempted to resolve the issue of warrantless
drug testing for all governmental employers, it would have encountered difficulties reaching such a decision under the parameters
it established for addressing the warrant issue. The Court did not
consider the nature of the operations of every governmental employer to reach an informed decision about the problems a warrant
requirement would create for each.
Had the Harmon court analyzed the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment, it would have been difficult to support a
conclusion that Justice Department officials need not comply with
warrant procedures.' 37 The Justice Department officials in Harmon
are not situated similarly to the railway supervisors in Skinner. 13 8

133.
134.
135.

Id.
See supra note 89-91 and accompanying text.
Coffin, supra note 17, at 33-35 (discussing the level of generality within the context

of balancing as a method of constitutional adjudication). During the October 1986 Term,
the Supreme Court tended to move "the focus of balancing from one individual or small
group in some program or institution to an entire category of people and activities." Id.
After discussing specific examples where, in Judge Coffin's opinion, the Court has in the
past moved the focus from the individual or small group to entire categories of people, he
concludes that if the Court should choose to "paint with a broad brush," its choice should
be deliberate, addressed, and the justificatibn explained. Id.
136. See supra notes 43-46, 80-81 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 52, 84-88 and accompanying text.

138.

See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Skinner found that warrant requirements

impede the achievement of the government's objective, because railroad supervisors are not
"in the business of investigating violations of the criminal laws or enforcing administrative
codes and have little occasion to become familiar with the intricacies of this Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence." Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
623-24 (1989).
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The Harmon court easily could have concluded that, unlike the

railroad supervisors, supervisors of Justice Department attorneys
are indeed familiar with both the "intricacies" of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and warrant procedures. If supervisors of
prosecuting attorneys are not held to the warrant requirement in
light of Skinner, it is unlikely that any governmental employer
would ever satisfy Skinner's rationale.
Alternatively, Harmon might have employed Von Raab's reasoning when deciding that Justice Department officials did not
need a search warrant. In Von Raab, the governmental officials
involved were likely to be more familiar with warrant procedures
than typical government supervisors, but the Court relied upon
assertions by Customs Service officials that warrant procedures
would impede the accomplishment of their "pressing responsibilities."'' 9 In Harmon, however, the Justice Department officials
offered no "pressing responsibilities" to justify their exemption
from warrant requirements.
The Harmon court expressed concerns, in light of Von Raab,
regarding the proper method of undertaking the balancing examination. The court observed:
The Von Raab majority made no effort to articulate an analytical rule
by which legitimate drug-testing programs could be distinguished from
illegitimate ones. It simply weighed individual privacy interests against
the government's policy objectives, enumerating several factors that it
deemed relevant in performing this balancing process. The Court did
not, however, indicate whether it deemed the case a close one, in the
sense that minor variations in the facts would have tipped the balance
in the other direction. Nor did it indicate which (if any) of0 the relevant
factors would be essential to a constitutional testing plan.'

These comments clearly suggest that more direction from the
Supreme Court would have been helpful.
An evaluation of competing interests for the purpose of balanc-

ing should include consideration of issues such as "the importance
of the interests affected, the seriousness of infringement . . . the

burden on the government in money, time, and efficacy of operations, and the availability of other feasible means to fulfill
governmental interests."' 4' Harmon extensively discusses the gov139. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666-67 (1989);
see supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
140. Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1056 (1990); see also Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(" Von Raab's balancing test is inherently, and doubtless intentionally, imprecise. The Court
did not purport to list all of the factors that should be weighed or to identify which factors
should be considered more weighty than others.").
141. Coffin, supra note 17, at 38.
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ernmental interests offered to justify the drug testing program;
however, it barely assesses the seriousness of the infringement
caused by the testing.' 42 The entirety of the court's assessment of
the seriousness of the resulting intrusion is its dismissal of the
employees' argument that this random testing program is substan43
tially more intrusive than the program validated in Von Raab.
Had the Harmon court evaluated the seriousness of the infringement upon the individual privacy interests at stake, it would have
considered the increased intrusion caused by the testing circumstances: The testing ordinarily proceeded upon short notice;'"4
employees were required to remove outer garments; 45 the testing
was supervised by a monitor of the same gender who allowed the
employee to urinate within a stall or petitioned area; 146 and the
random character of the testing could subject employees to repeated
intrusions. 47 Each of these factors should have been part of the
total mix of information considered when determining the seriousness of the intrusion and whether it 4exceeded the minimal intrusions
upheld in Skinner and Von Raab. 1
2.

National Federation of Federal Employees v. Cheney

In National Federation of Federal Employees v. Cheney,149 the
D.C. Circuit again engaged in judicial balancing when addressing
a Fourth Amendment challenge to drug testing, this time of civilian
army employees. 50 Even the court's phrasing of the issue presupposes that balancing would resolve the constitutional question:
"Does the government's need to conduct the suspicionless searches
outweigh the privacy interests of the covered employees in such a
fashion that it is 'impractical to require a warrant or some level
of individualized suspicion'?"l1'
Unlike Harmon, Cheney does not ignore the analogical reasoning
process used in Skinner. While Cheney expressed Skinner's rea-

142. 878 F.2d at 489-93.
143. Id.; see also supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
144. Id. at 486; cf. supra note 103 and accompanying text (surprise or shortened notice
associated with random testing increases the seriousness of the intrusion).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 489.
148. See Williams, supra note 3, at 43-48 (discussing inquiries to be posed when
determining the extent to which a testing program intrudes upon an individual's privacy

interests).
149. 884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1989).
150. Id. at 608-15.
151. Id. at 608 (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 665-66 (1989)).
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soning in terms of the Supreme Court's determination of the
reasonablenessof the testing at issue, Cheney at least acknowledges
that Skinner considers a number of factors when adjudicating the
constitutionality of the railroad's post-accident drug testing program.' However, the Cheney panel did not resort to application
of Skinner's standards when reaching its decision.
In contrast to Harmon, Cheney briefly considers the propriety
of requiring governmental officials to comply with the Fourth
Amendment's warrant provision. Abbreviating the "special needs"
analysis used in Skinner'5 3 and Von Raab, 5 4 Cheney simply reviews
the government's stated purposes for testing. 55 Concluding that
the governmental interests in testing were "clearly other than the
ordinary need for law enforcement," the Cheney court held that
no warrant is required. 56
There are a number of similarities between the court's reasoning
in Cheney and Harmon. Consistent with its approach in Harmon,
the court in Cheney dismisses arguments that the random nature
of the Army's testing program results in a more severe invasion
of privacy than was the case in the Skinner and Von Raab
programs.' 57 The Cheney court, while recognizing that the intrusiveness stemming from this type program is a relevant consideration, fails, as in Harmon, to find that the consideration is one
requiring a different analysis from that engaged in by the Court
in Skinner and Von Raab.' Unlike Harmon, however, Cheney
does involve some evaluation of the seriousness of the intrusion.15 9
152. See id. (stating that Skinner considered: "(1) the 'limited' intrustions occasioned
by the testing procedures; (2) the diminished expectation of privacy that attaches to
employment in an 'industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety'; and (3) the
government's 'compelling' or 'surpassing' interest in railway safety, an interest that could
not adequately be protected by testing only upon individualized suspicion" (citations
omitted). Characterizations of intrusions as limited are not synonymous with characterization
of intrustions as minimal. The court's reference to "limited" intrusions appears to stem
from a tendency to equate the concept of "limiting" an intrusion upon privacy interests
with the concept of assessing the qualitative severity of the intrusion. Limited intrusions
should be thought of as those resulting from policies and procedures which define and
circumscribe the scope of the intrusion. Minimal intrusions, however, represent the judgment
formed after qualitative assessment of the severity of the intrusion upon individual privacy
interests. Policies and procedures could conceivably limit a very substantial intrusion.
153. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
155. Cheney, 884 F.2d at 608 (concluding that the testing program had three stated
purposes, none of which appeared related to law enforcement goals: "(1) assisting in
determining employee fitness, (2) identifying and treating drug abusers, and (3) maintaining
national security and the internal security of the Defense Department").
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 609.
159. Id. at 610-15; cf. Williams, supra note 3, at 72-73 (concluding that the diminished
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The court's discussion focuses primarily upon the extent to which

existing regulations had previously diminished the workers' privacy
expectations.1 60 Balancing as undertaken in Cheney, albeit incomplete, at least includes some assessment of the seriousness of the
infringement upon employees' privacy interests.
3. American Federation of Government Employees v. Skinner
16
American Federation of Government Employees v. Skinner
involved a challenge to a drug testing plan requiring random testing
of certain Department of Transportation (DOT) employees. 162 As
expected after Harmon and Cheney, the D.C. Circuit focused upon
Von Raab "special needs" language. The court stated it would

"'balance the individual[s'] privacy expectations against the Government's interest to determine whether it [is] impractical to require
a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular
context.'

"'163

The court briefly considered the warrant issue. However, as in
Cheney, the court abbreviated the "special needs" examination to

a consideration of the government's stated goals for testing. The
court then concluded that because the government's goals did not

include law enforcement and because non-consensual disclosure of
test results to police authorities was proscribed, special needs

existed to forego warrant requirements. 16

privacy expectation analysis is inconsistent with the intentions of the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment and promotes litigation rather than cooperation with employer goals).
160. Id. at 611-15 (concluding that the chemical and nuclear surety employees' privacy
expectations are diminished because they are required to report all prescription drug use
and update background information, and are subjected to regular medical exams; noting
that civilian guards and police are required to undergo a variety of.privacy diminishing
tests and investigations as a condition of employment in a high-security, military context;
reasoning that drug counselors should expect inquiry into their fitness and probity but not
elaborating upon any activities which may have diminished the expectation; and concluding
that privacy expectations of those employed in positions involving performance of urinalysis
testing of others had not been diminished previously by pre-employment or employment
procedures).
161. 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923 (1990).
162. Id. at 889, 892 (ninety-four percent of the employees subject to the random testing
worked for the Federal Aviation Administration, with nearly two-thirds of these individuals
working as air traffic controllers; however, the DOT also tested motor vehicle operators
who transported visiting foreign dignitaries, key Department officials, and passenger-laden
shuttle buses).
163. Id. at 889 (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 665-66 (1989)).
164. Id. The court's statement to the effect that "the testing plan serves needs other
than law enforcement, and therefore need not necessarily be supported by any level of
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American Federation of Government Employees attempts to
apply Skinner's reasoning; unfortunately the court viewed Skinner

as a balancing case." 5 Thus, instead of considering whether the

search advanced important governmental goals that would be
jeopardized by individualized suspicion requirements, the court
balanced governmental interests against the privacy intrusions to
determine the constitutionality of the testing program.
When applying its balancing test, however, the court did not
even consider aspects of the testing that increased the seriousness
of the privacy intrusion upon the employees tested.'6 Instead, the

court summarily concluded that those aspects were neither dispo-

sitive nor the "sine qua non of constitutionality. ' 16 7 There was no
evaluation of the competing interests; instead the seriousness of
the intrusions upon employee's privacy interests was determined
solely by reference to Harmon and Von Raab. The court seemed
to apply per se rules: Harmon does not require a different weight
to be assigned to the individual interests at stake because the
testing is random; Von Raab does not mandate testing within a

medical environment. 6 8 Random testing was upheld because the
job titles and duties of the employees to be tested were similar to

those approved for random testing in earlier decisions.169 This
adjudication of the constitutional issues, therefore, is based on
whether the employees fall within certain categories of jobs which
had been approved previously for drug testing.

particularized suspicion," suggests that the court might conclude with the adjudication of
the constitutionality of the program at this point. However, the court also considered the
"reasonableness" of the program; using balancing to decide if "the public interest would
be best served by requiring a standard of reasonableness short of particularized suspicion."
Id.
165. Id. at 890-91 (observing that Skinner was a natural starting point for determining
whether the DOT's safety interests justified the testing; and concluding that the Skinner
analysis was "fully applicable").
166. Id. at 891. Noting that the testing program at issue entailed a intrusion different
from that approved in Skinner, the court stated: "While it is true that the regulations
sustained in Skinner required testing only after a triggering event and in a medical
environment, we do not find that either of these facts compels 'a fundamentally different
analysis from that pursued by the Supreme Court.' While it is true that random testing
may increase employee anxiety and the invasion of subjective expectations of privacy, it
also limits discretion in the selection process and presumably enhances drug-use deterrence."
Id. (citing Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1056 (1990)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 891; cf. Hartness v. Bush, 919 F.2d 170, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
II I S. Ct. 864 (1991) (recognizing "per se rules of specialized application which automatically allow searches of pre-determined scope under specified circumstances" and drawing
"clear demarcation lines" in drug testing cases).
169. Id. at 891-93 (finding the risks posed by impaired individuals working as hazardous
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4.

Treasury Employees v. Yeutter and Hartness v. Bush
These cases were considered by the same panel of judges and
the opinions were issued on the same day. 70 In Treasury Employees
v. Yeutter, the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), on
behalf of motor vehicle operators, challenged a federal program
mandating random urinalysis testing of certain United States Department of Agriculture employees.' 7' The Yeutter court viewed
both Skinner and Von Raab as endorsing balancing as the appropriate means for adjudicating the constitutionality of the suspicionless testing. 72 Noting that the Department of Agriculture's
program paralleled the Department of Transportation program
upheld in American Federation of Government Employees, Yeutter
concludes that a court need only decide "whether the few distinctions between these situations require ... a different result."', 73 In
effect, then, the court adjudicated by comparing the governmental
and individual interests with those deemed sufficient to uphold
suspicionless testing in American Federation of Government Employees.
The NTEU attempted to diminish the weight assigned to the
government's interest in testing FNS drivers by arguing that the
governmental interest in this case is much weaker than that presented in American Federation of Government Employees. 74 FNS
drivers primarily chauffeur officials and deliver documents, while
the DOT drivers in American Federationof Government Employees
routinely drove shuttle buses. 75 The Yeutter court, however, refused to engage in what it characterized as "line-drawing" based
on the number of passengers that drivers carry each day. 76 It
concluded that the governmental interest in testing FNS drivers is
no less "compelling" than those interests the court had deemed
''compelling" in other instances. 77 The court may have been
material inspectors and aircraft mechanics parallel the risks posed by drug-impaired Army
guards stationed near explosive munitions and any aircraft controllers, pilots, and aviation
mechanics examined in Cheney; upholding testing of van operators because, similar to the
employees in Von Raab, they have access to sensitive information).
170. Treasury Employees v. Yeutter, 918 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Hartness, 919 F.2d
at 170 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
171. Yeutter, 918 F.2d at 969-70.

172. Id.at 971.
173.

Id. (examining only whether the "specific duties of FNS and DOT drivers and

differences in reasonable privacy expectations between the two groups might justify different
outcomes").
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 972. Relying upon Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, vacated sub nom.
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correct in observing that artificial distinctions based on the number
of passengers carried by a motor vehicle operator do not provide
an appropriate basis for constitutional adjudication. However, the
court's comparisons of governmental interests, likewise, were not
an appropriate basis for constitutional adjudication. Rather, the
court should have focused upon the constitutional standards established by the Supreme Court in Skinner and Von Raab. Furthermore, the court could have appropriately recognized distinctions
between the safety interests implicated by public carriers and those
raised by isolated instances where the government provides transportation for individual employees.
The court also found no significant differences in the privacy
expectations of FNS drivers and DOT motor vehicle operators,
even though FNS drivers do not undergo the extensive background
checks experienced by DOT drivers. 17 The court held that the FNS
drivers' expectations of privacy are sufficiently diminished because
the drivers are required to submit a physician's certificate attesting
to their physical and mental fitness and that they are free of any
drug habits. 79 Again, the focus, when assessing the extent of the
resulting intrusion upon employees' privacy interests, should have
been the constitutional standards established in Skinner and Von
Raab: the intrusions upon employees' privacy interests should have
been examined to determine whether they are greater than minimal
intrusions.
Hartness v. Bush involves a challenge to a governmental testing
program mandating random testing for those persons working in
the Executive Office of the President who hold "secret" national
security clearances. 8 0 The same panel' that decided Yeutter noted
that the testing procedures for personnel holding "top secret"
clearances are identical to the procedures that the court upheld in
Harmon.12 Balancing was eschewed in favor of the application of
per se rules that would yield a predetermined balancing result.

Jenkins v. Jones, 490 U.S. 1001, modified, 878 F.2d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the court
noted that the governmental interest in testing the school bus attendants was just as
compelling as the governmental interest in testing the drivers.).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Hartness v. Bush, 919 F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2890
(1991).
181. Id. at 171. The three judge panel consisted of Judges Silberman, the author of
the majority opinion, Mikva, concurring, and Edwards, dissenting.
182. Id.

HeinOnline -- 40 U. Kan. L. Rev. 761 1991-1992

KANSAS LAW REviEw

[Vol. 40

The opinion of Judge Silberman in Hartness interprets prior
drug testing holdings as establishing certain propositions:
[U]rinalysis testing is a significant intrusion into the privacy interests of
employees and as such is a search within the Fourth Amendment and
it does not require a warrant, a probable cause, or any level of
individualized suspicion, but is instead governed by the balancing process
weighing the interest of the government qua employer against the privacy
interests of the employees. Those governmental interests powerful enough
to justify urinalysis testing include the public security interests that can
be endangered by employees with access to national security information,
by personnel who carry firearms in the course of their employment, by
personnel with access to drugs or who prosecute drug cases, by employees
who control or have access to dangerous instrumentalities. 83

Further, when interpreting the Harmon holding, Judge Silberman
was of the opinion that Harmon may be presumed to have used
a balancing test which would always yield only one result. m4 He
reasoned that the Supreme Court had in the past "preserved the
overall balancing test of 'reasonableness' required by the Fourth
Amendment while articulating several per se rules of specialized
application which automatically allow searches of pre-determined
scope under specified circumstances."' 85 In contrast to the Yeutter
decision, which was authored by Judge Mikva, Judge Silberman
concluded that a number of the drug-testing cases of the D.C.
Court of Appeals had drawn clear lines of demarcation. 8 6 Finding
no distinction of constitutional significance between persons with
top secret clearances and those with secret clearances, Judge Silberman summarily concluded that the judicial balancing process,
if performed, would yield a result in favor of the government. 8 7
Judge Mikva concurred with the judgment. In light of the
balancing examination he undertook in Yeutter, however, his concurrence appears not to resort to per se rules when deciding the
constitutionality issue. Judge Mikva agreed that Harmon is a
starting point. Therefore, the differences between the governmental
interest in testing workers with secret clearances would not be
significant enough to "tip the constitutional scales" against testing. 8 Judge Mikva, unlike Judge Silberman, framed the court's
decision within balancing terminology.

183. Id. at 172 (citations omitted).
184. Id. at 173.

185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 174.
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Judge Silberman's opinion in Hartness v. Bush draws a rather
lengthy dissent from Judge Edwards criticizing the court for embracing a per se rule. 1 9 His dissent argues that there can be no
"drug exception" to the Fourth Amendment. 19 Judge Edwards
characterized the majority's approval of the Executive Office's
testing program as a "symbolic victory" in the "war on drugs."' 191
Following a detailed discussion of the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, Judge Edwards's dissent concludes that the
balancing test endorsed in Skinner and Von Raab is a "minimal"
Fourth Amendment standard. 92 Assigning a narrow focus to Von
Raab, Judge Edwards argued that Von Raab endorses a "case-bycase, highly contextual approach to weighing the national security
interests advanced by particular drug testing programs," which is
the "antithesis" of a bright line rule. 93
Judge Edwards' dissent appears more consistent with Skinner
and Von Raab because it appropriately assigns a narrow focus to
the Supreme Court decisions. It eschews per se rules which would
predetermine the constitutionality of testing individuals according
to their job categories or security clearances. In light of the Court's
prior expressions of a balancing examination, which entails a fluid
process of weighing the competing interests, it is reasonable to
expect Judge Edwards to describe the balancing examination as a
minimal constitutional standard. However, as discussed in Part II
of this Article, the Supreme Court has already performed most of
the balancing task, leaving to lower courts the task of determining
the qualitative weights of the competing interests. Judicial balancing within the context of suspicionless drug testing, therefore,
should be an exacting examination of governmental and individual
privacy interests rather than a minimal constitutional standard.
C. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
The Ninth Circuit, like the D.C. Circuit, has had considerable
litigation involving challenges to drug testing programs. 94 Bluestein
v. Skinner' addresses the constitutionality of drug testing regulations promulgated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
that require random testing of flight crew members, maintenance
personnel, air traffic controllers, and several other categories of

189.

Id.

190. Id.
191.
683-84
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 175 (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 181.
Id. at 179.
See Betty Jo Christian & Janice Barber, Employee Drug Testing in the Transpor-
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employees in the private commercial aviation industry. 196
The Ninth Circuit used Von Raab's "special needs" balancing,
but the court considered the warrant issue using an abbreviated
"special needs" examination. Finding the goals of the FAA testing
program did not involve law enforcement, Bluestein held that a
warrant is not necessary and proceeded with balancing.' 97 As in
Harmon, Cheney, and American Federation of Government Employees, the employees in Bluestein argued that the randomness of
the testing increases the intrusion: The FAA regulations provided
for unannounced immediate testing while the Customs Service's
testing in Von Raab requires at least a five-day notice. 9 8 The
employees in Bluestein also argued that the randomness of the
program entailed a more extensive intrusion than the program in
Von Raab because the Customs Service's testing is invoked only
upon the occurrence of certain events.'9 Nevertheless, the Ninth
Circuit followed the lead of the D.C. Circuit in Harmon and
concluded that although these factors add weight to the "'invasion
of privacy' side of the Fourth Amendment balance," they are
insufficient to "tip the scales." 2 This view of the balancing
process precludes consideration of whether the testing entails greater
than the minimal intrusions approved in Skinner and Von Raab.
Thus, the balancing result is predetermined in favor of the government if the FAA testing program cannot be "meaningfully
distinguished" from the program approved in Von Raab.01 Again,
the court utilized adjudication by categorization or the application
of per se rules. If the testing program is similar to those approved
by previous courts, no balancing is actually necessary; the court
may reject the employees' constitutional challenge to the FAA
drug testing program simply because it is so similar to others
previously approved.
In a later opinion, IBEW, Local 1245 v. Skinner,2 2 the Ninth
Circuit considered a Fourth Amendment challenge to rules requir-

tation Industry: Private Initiatives and Government Imperatives, 12 GEo. MASON U. L.
REV. 561, 581 (1990) (discussing litigation brought in the Ninth Circuit challenging Department of Transportation drug testing regulations; noting that plaintiffs viewed the Ninth
Circuit as a sympathetic court in light of its earlier invalidation of other drug testing
programs).
195.

908 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 954 (1991).

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 453.
Id.at 455.
Id. at 456.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 457.
913 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1990).
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ing random drug testing of employees engaged in work involving
the production of natural gas, liquified natural gas, and hazardous
liquid pipeline operations. 2 3 As in Bluestein, the court framed its
task in terms of balancing. 204 In this case, however, the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning suggests that the court views the balancing
process as more than a comparison of competing interests. The
court initially considered whether the government demonstrated a
compelling interest to justify the drug testing rules. 20 5 The governmental employer identified a safety interest as its justification for
the drug testing program. 201 Acknowledging that Bluestein and Von
Raab recognized a compelling governmental interest in deterring
drug use and its attendant harms, occurring from abuse in the
airline industry and the Customs Service, respectively, the court
in IBEW agreed that the threat of harm which could result from
a pipeline accident was a "strong" governmental interest. 207 The
court was of the opinion that random drug testing offers the best
potential deterrent to drug use, and when coupled with the possibility of a catastrophic accident, is sufficient to establish a
"strong governmental interest" in random testing.20
The Ninth Circuit examined the seriousness of the privacy infringement from two vantage points: "(1) whether as a result of
other circumstances employees in this industry already have a
diminished expectation of privacy; and (2) whether the particular
testing program minimizes the intrusion of privacy.'"'2 IBEW
concludes that the employees had diminished expectations of pri210
vacy because of prior regulation of potential safety hazards.
Although the court then merely glossed over the nature of the
intrusion implicated by the testing, MEW's analysis is unique in

203. Id. at 1455-56. The rules were promulgated by the Research and Special Programs
Administrations (RSPA) of the United States Department of Transportation (DOT).
204. Id. at 1461. The opinion stated that "we must therefore 'balance the individual's
privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical
to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context.' "
Id. (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66

(1989)).
205. Id.
206. Id. The court stated: " '[T]he clear public interest in assuring that certain sensitive
safety-related pipeline personnel perform their duties free of prohibited substances provides
justification for testing . . . .' " (quoting 53 Fed. Reg. 47, 085 (1988)).
207. IBEW,913 F.2d at 1461.

208. Id. at 1462-63.
209. Id. (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626-27
(1989)).
210. Id. at 1463 (concluding also that the employees worked in a highly regulated
industry).
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one respect: The court reasoned that the absence of individualized
suspicion increased the intrusiveness of the testing on an employee's
privacy. 21' The court, however, offered no explanation of why the
absence of individualized suspicion contributes to the seriousness
of the intrusion. The Ninth Circuit's discussion did, at least,
include a distinct comparison of the governmental interests at
stake, with the resulting intrusion upon employees' privacy. 21 2 The
court even gave cursory consideration to regulations it characterized
as "unprecedented" because they provided for post-accident testing
of employees who are unable to consent to a urine sample due to
their injury or unconsciousness.2 13 Persuaded by the government's
assertion that no intrusion :of employees' bodies was intended by
21 4
the regulations, the court found the regulations constitutional.
However, a regulation that carries the potential for invading an
employee's body should merit more extensive consideration. It
seems untenable that a urine sample may be obtained from an
unconscious employee without some invasive process. Yet the court
seems to have uncritically accepted the government's assertions
that no such invasions were "intended."
D.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

The Seventh Circuit, in Taylor v. O'Grady, addressed a challenge
to a Cook County, Illinois drug testing program which requires
annual mandatory urine testing for all Department of Corrections
employees. 2'5 The district court had enjoined the testing, finding

211. Id. at 1464 & n.28 (noting that the petitioners did not contend that the testing
procedures themselves were intrusive; the procedures called for the use of stalls or partitioned
areas for privacy).
212. Id. at 1463-64 (deciding that regulations concerning performance, medical fitness
for duty, or training and ability to perform particular trades "suggest" potential safety
hazards of the industry, the court found that these regulations diminish expectations of
privacy). The court concluded that the "level of intrusiveness does not justify striking down
the random drug testing rule." Id. at 1464.
213. Id. at 1464 n.29.
214. Id.
215. 888 F.2d 1189, 1191-92 (7th Cir. 1989). Correctional officers were compelled to
produce one urine specimen for drug testing each year. They had no advance notice of the
specific day of the testing. Employees scheduled for testing were advised during roll call
at the beginning of their shift and were given the remainder of the day to produce a
specimen. After notification of selection for testing, employees were taken to a holding
area where they remained until the close of their shift. Selected employees, if unable to
produce a specimen during that period, could be terminated. Immediately prior to producing
the specimen, the employee could specify medical information relating to drug use history
which might explain a false positive result. The employee was accompanied by a testing
administrator of the same sex into the restroom and was subjected to a pat-down search.
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it violated the Fourth Amendment because it failed to advance the
government's interests in ensuring that its work force was not
impaired and in preventing the smuggling of drugs to prisoners.2" 6
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit had the benefit of the Supreme
Court's intervening decisions in Skinner and Von Raab. Nevertheless, citing Von Raab, the Seventh Circuit resorted to a balancing
test to determine the constitutionality of suspicionless searches
associated with the drug testing program.2 7
Initially, Taylor observes that the Supreme Court has already
recognized some special governmental interests as meriting suspicionless drug testing. Taylor concludes, however, that while these
interests may rise to the level of compelling in some instances,
such a showing is not required to find a program constitutional.
The Seventh Circuit questioned whether certain qualitative weights
are necessary for interests to balance in favor of one party or
another:2 1
While the governmental interests at issue in Von Raab happened to be
compelling, this is not predicate to the holding; it is unclear what the
Court would have done if the interest had not been compelling as the
Court gave us no indication if this was a close call. Indeed, if Von
Raab were read to hold that a compelling interest were [sic] necessary,
the balancing test would become almost insignificant. What is clear is
that we are to perform a balancing test: if the intrusion on the individual
is minimal, then the government need not have a compelling interest.
In such a case, a valid or substantial interest would be sufficient.2 9

According to Taylor, Von Raab does not assign a qualitative
weight to the governmental interest that must be present for a
constitutional suspicionless testing program. This interpretation,

During urination the testing administrator was to maintain "some visual contact" with the
officer from a "discreet distance." Generally it was not required or recommended that the
officer observe the flow of urine from the officer's body to the cup. Women officers were
allowed to produce a specimen within a stall with the door closed and male officers used
a urinal. If a screening test was positive, the specimens were then sent to laboratories for
confirmatory testing. Id. at 1191-92.
216. Id. at 1192-93; see supra notes 64-69, and accompanying text. The Supreme Court
in Skinner considered whether testing advanced an important governmental interest to be
a crucial factor when sustaining a suspicionless post-accident testing program.
217. Id. at 1194 (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 668 (1989)). The court held that "the issue of governmental suspicionless urinalysis
for drug screening essentially rests on a balancing test: the interests of the government
balanced against the privacy interest of the employees." Id. at 1195. The Seventh Circuit
balancing was used to absolve the government from warrant, probable cause, and individualized suspicion requirements.
218. Cf. infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
219. 888 F.2d at 1195 n.8.
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however, is at odds with the express language of Von Raab.220 The
Taylor court's reference to a "substantial" governmental interest
has some support in the Supreme Court's decision in New York
"
v. Burger.22
' However, Burger concerned the constitutionality of
warrantless rather than suspicionless searches.2 22 The Seventh Circuit appropriately raised an issue as to whether the interests subject
to balancing must conform to qualitative weights of a particular
dimension. In resolving this question, however, the court failed to
consider that the Supreme Court might have performed most of
the balancing required for adjudicating suspicionless drug testing
policies.
Incident to applying its balancing test, Taylor undertakes a
detailed review of the governmental interests served and the privacy
intrusions implicated by the drug testing program. Taylor discusses
three governmental interests advanced by the Corrections Department: "fostering the public's perception of the integrity of its
work force; maintaining an unimpaired, physically fit work force;
and preventing the smuggling of drugs to prisoners by correctional
officers. '"223 Taylor deems the generalized interest in the integrity
of the work force insufficient to justify the privacy invasions
associated with drug testing. 224 However, the remaining interests
are "more than substantial," and therefore sufficiently weighty to
overcome the privacy interests of the tested employees.22
In Taylor, the Seventh Circuit concluded that "[a]ll urinalysis
programs implicate serious privacy concerns regardless of how
carefully tailored the program is designed. "226 Characterization of
these privacy concerns as "serious," suggests more than "minimal"
intrusion; nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the
intrusion does not outweigh the governmental interests and is not
much different from that occurring in Skinner and Von Raab.227
Accordingly, neither the short notice given to subjected employees
nor the fact that the sample was collected by non-medical personnel

220. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
221. 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (requiring a "substantial" governmental interest to justify
the regulatory scheme authorizing warrantless searches).
222. Id.
223. Taylor, 888 F.2d. at 1196.
224. Id.; cf. Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990) (deeming a governmental interest in promoting the public
image of integrity as insufficient to overcome the privacy interests of employees).
225. See Taylor, 888 F.2d at 1196, 1199 (limiting implicated employees to those with
direct prisoner contact).
226. Id. at 1197-98 (observing that "[b]eing compelled to urinate while under monitor
is intrusive and often embarrassing and uncomfortable.").
227.

Id. at 1198.
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distinguishes the testing in Taylor from 228that approved by the
Supreme Court in Skinner and Von Raab.
Taylor's application of the balancing test includes a scrutiny of
the class of subjected employees, ensuring that their job duties
229
directly implicate the two recognized governmental interests.
Acknowledging the existence of a relationship between the governmental interest and drug testing of employees whose work required
regular contact with prisoners, or who would have opportunities
to smuggle drugs to prisoners, the Seventh Circuit declined to
20
uphold the district court's injunction.
E.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

The Sixth Circuit in Penny v. Kennedy21 addressed the constitutionality of the City of Chattanooga's drug testing program
which mandates random urinalysis testing of fire fighters and police
officers. 212 The district court balanced the privacy interests of the
employees against those of the city employer and decided that the
government officials must have a reasonable suspicion of drug use
to impose mandatory testing. 233 Relying upon the rationales of
Skinner and Von Raab, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district
court's particularized suspicion requirement must fail. 234 The Sixth
Circuit, in contrast to the Ninth and D.C. Circuits, focused on
aspects of Skinner rather than Von Raab. The court applied the
Supreme Court's statement in Skinner that employees "subject to
the tests discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others
[and themselves] that even a momentary lapse of attention can
have disastrous consequences. ' 235 The Sixth Circuit, concluding
that ensuring that firefighters and police officers were not impaired
while on duty is a compelling interest, found that requiring a
particularized suspicion of drug or alcohol use would seriously
23 6
impede the advancement of the established compelling interest.
Therefore, the suspicionless testing could proceed if, on remand,

228. Id.at 1198-99.
229. Id. at 1199-1200 (citing American Federation of Government Employees v. Skinner,
885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding testing by nonmedical personnel), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 923 (1990)).
230. Id.at 1200.
231. 915 F.2d 1065 (6th Cir. 1990).
232. Id.'at 1066.
233. Id.
234. Id.at 1068.
235. Id.at 1067.
236. Id.
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the testing2 was found consonant with other Fourth Amendment
standards. 11
While the Sixth Circuit purportedly considered Skinner when
reaching its decision, it clearly omitted aspects of Skinner's analysis. It only assessed the weight of the governmental interest offered
to justify the searches, concluding that it was compelling. The
court did not correspondingly consider the seriousness of the
intrusion upon the employees subject to the testing. It summarily
concluded that these compelling governmental interests would be
jeopardized by individualized suspicion requirements. It did not
consider whether the drug testing program advances the governmental interests within the context of police and fire department
working environs. Unlike Skinner, there is no independent consideration of whether the warrantless character of the searches renders
them unconstitutional. Instead, it appears that the Sixth Circuit
simply read Skinner and Von Raab as permitting drug testing
without individualized suspicion. The court's rationale for imposing
the Skinner and Von Raab holdings upon the cases before it is
therefore conclusory and perfunctory.
F.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

The Fifth Circuit, in National Treasury Employees Union v.
Bush, addressed a challenge to the constitutionality of a Presidential Executive Order that mandates random testing for federal
workers in sensitive positions and reasonable suspicion testing for
other employees. 238 Because the case involved a facial challenge to
the Executive Order, the court did not find that it was required
23 9
to perform any balancing of privacy and governmental interests.
According to the court, its task was to decide if there were any
24
set of circumstances under which the Order would be valid. 0
Applying this standard, the court concluded that the Presidential
Order was constitutional.2 41 Incident to such conclusion, however,
the court offered its view of the Skinner and Von Raab decisions.
Consistent with the D.C., Ninth, and Seventh Circuits, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that warrantless drug-testing searches should be
evaluated by balancing the individuals' privacy interests against
the government's interests in testing. 242 Citing Skinner, however,

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See id.
891 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 101.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 101 n.3.
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the court reasoned that "the tests must be 'minimally intrusive'
and the government's interest 'compelling.' "243 While the court's
comments are apparently dicta, they are significant because they
assign qualitative weights to the nature of the governmental interest, "compelling," and the seriousness of the individual intrusion,
"minimal." If the Fifth Circuit would adhere to this interpretation
of Skinner, balancing would assume a different perspective. Drug
testing programs requiring intrusions that are greater than a "minimal" intrusion, or involving governmental interests that are less
than "compelling," would tip the scales in favor of the individual
subject to the testing.
G.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

The Fourth Circuit, in Thompson v. Marsh, rejected a Fourth
Amendment challenge to the Army's performance of random drug
tests on certain civilian employees hired to work at a chemical
weapons plant. 2" The Fourth Circuit recognized no distinction
between the post-accident testing in Skinner and the Army's random testing program. According to the Fourth Circuit, Skinner
holds that "random drug tests do not violate the Fourth Amendment in limited circumstances where important governmental interests outweigh individuals' expectations of privacy.' 24 1 Thus,
unlike some other circuits, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged no
distinction between random testing programs and those approved
in Skinner and Von Raab.246 The court should have recognized
that the random character of the Thompson drug testing program
potentially subjects employees to more frequent intrusions with
less advance notice than the drug testing programs reviewed in
Skinner and Von Raab and, therefore, increases the intrusiveness
of the search.
The Fourth Circuit did not consider the "special needs" examination or any other rationale for exempting the Thompson program from the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause. When
assessing the governmental interest, the court focused only on the
specific risks associated with impaired employee performance and
the governmental interest-public safety.247 This focus is appro-

243.
244.
245.

Id.
884 F.2d 113, 114 (4th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 114-15. The court also concluded that Von Raab applied the same balancing

test when upholding the Customs Service drug testing program. Id.

246.

See supra notes 22, 70, 127, 157-58, 166-67, 200-01, 227-29 and accompanying

text.

247. Thompson, 884 F.2d at 114 (discussing the hazards posed by the chemical agents
with which the employees worked).
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priate and consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Skinner, which considers the relationship between the employee's job
duties and the risks the governmental employer seeks to avoid by
drug testing. When evaluating the seriousness of the resulting
privacy intrusion, however, the court focused primarily on factors
that diminish privacy expectations ,248 failing to assess the increased
seriousness of the intrusion associated with the randomness of
testing. 249 Judicial balancing in this case is insufficient because the
court failed to completely assess the competing interests.
H.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals

In Transport Workers' Union v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority, the Third Circuit upheld random drug
testing of employees holding safety sensitive positions within the
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) mass
transit system. 250 Focusing on "extensive evidence of a severe drug
abuse problem among [the] operating employees" and concluding
that there is an "extraordinarily compelling government interest"
in testing the railway operating personnel the court summarily
decided the program is constitutional. 25 It is not apparent that the
court engaged in any form of judicial balancing. Finding that the
program had been carefully tailored to cover only employees in
safety-sensitive positions, and that the random selection procedures
sufficiently protected employees against an abuse of discretion by
government officials, the court focused only upon the "extraordinary compelling governmental interest.' '252
I.

The First Circuit Court of Appeals

The First Circuit, in Guiney v. Roache, vacated a decision of
the district court that had found the random drug testing policy
of the Boston Police Department unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. 2"3 Finding no significant distinction between the police
officers, who carried firearms and participated in drug interdiction
activities, and the Customs officers in Von Raab, the court found

248. Id. (noting that the employees were required to take annual physicals including
both blood and urine tests and that they had been subject to extensive background checks).
249. Id. (noting that the Army's program complied with the Health and Human Services
guidelines and that the Supreme Court in Von Raab had concluded that the guidelines
"significantly minimize[d]" the program's intrusiveness). The Supreme Court in Von Raab
did not address the constitutionality of random testing.
250. 884 F.2d 709, 712 (3d Cir. 1988).
251. Id. at 711-13.
252. Id. at 712.
253. 873 F.2d 1557, 1558 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 963 (1989).
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the Police Department's drug testing scheme constitutional.25 4 The
court adjudicated the constitutionality of the testing rules by
determining whether the employees at issue fell within the categories of employees who previously had been considered as constitutionally subject to testing in Von Raab. The problem with this
form of adjudication, which focuses on determining whether the
employees in question fit within a particular category of employees
appropriate for suspicionless testing, is that adjudication by categorization overlooks examination of the particular drug testing
procedures at issue.
IV.

POST-SKINNER

AND

VON RAAB FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT

JURISPRUDENCE

A.

The Issues Raised by the Courts' Decisions
Several issues are raised by the decisions of the eight circuits
that have spoken on this topic. The circuit courts of appeals almost
uniformly have assigned a broad focus to Skinner's and Von
Raab's warrantless testing findings. However, neither of the Court's
opinions, nor the "special needs" examination used to address the
warrantless searches, justify reading the opinions expansively as
endorsing warrantless employment drug testing programs under all
circumstances. Yet, with the exceptions of the D.C. Circuit's
opinions in Cheney and American Federation of Government
Employees, and the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Bluestein, courts
generally do not discuss the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause.
These inconsistent approaches suggest that there is considerable
confusion over the appropriate analytical approach.
The answer lies in the Supreme Court's decisions in Skinner and
Von Raab. While there are inconsistencies between the Court's
analyses in these two cases, the decision are at least consistent in
their approach to the warrant issue. Both consider the warrant
question and articulate the "special needs" examination as controlling the constitutionality of warrantless employment drug testing. Furthermore, they both rely upon Camara's211 rationale,
entailing an examination of two criteria: what, if any, additional
protections would the warrant afford employees subject to the
search; and would the warrant requirement impose burdens upon
the government's ability to accomplish its legitimate objectives.
Each circuit has foregone consideration of these inquiries, generally
failing tooffer any justification for doing so. Yet in some cases,
where warrant issues seem to be the grist mill of governmental
activities, some explanation should have been offered for absolving
government officials from warrant requirements.
254.
255.

Id. at 1558.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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Additionally, the appropriate constitutional standard for evaluating the constitutionality of suspicionless searches is unclear.
Skinner endorses a tri-factor approach that focuses not only upon
the relative weights of the governmental interests at stake and the
intrusions upon privacy interests, but also upon other considerations associated with the necessity of a suspicionless search. First,
Skinner requires that suspicionless drug testing be justified in terms
of its utility in advancing the particular governmental interest.
Second, Skinner demands that the individualized suspicion requirement jeopardize attainment of important governmental objectives.
Finally, Skinner's, constitutional standard assigns relative weights
to the interests at issue; the governmental interest must be "important" and the privacy intrusion "minimal." In contrast, Von
Raab endorses the use of a judicial balancing process for evaluating
the constitutionality of suspicionless searches. Nevertheless, in doing so, Von Raab constrains the judicial balancing examination,
noting that only under those "limited circumstances" where the
government's need to discover "latent or hidden conditions," or
to "prevent their development" is "sufficiently compelling" may
governmental intrusions proceed without any "measure of individualized suspicion."'256

However, the circuits rarely discern any distinction between the
adjudicative methods used in Skinner and those used in Von
Raab.257 The question is, therefore, which method is appropriate
for which set of circumstances. Clearly, Skinner and Von Raab
offer little guidance for making this decision; thus, the choice of
method must lie somewhere within the rationales of these two
cases. It seems that the Von Raab balancing standard should be
left to those unique and limited circumstances where the governmental employer can demonstrate that latent, hidden conditions
accompany employee drug use or intoxication and that such conditions cannot be discovered by the use of traditional supervisory
methods. If this view is correct, then the circuits' routine use of
the balancing method to adjudicate constitutional challenges to
drug testing programs is inappropriate, particularly where employees work in office settings where their behavior can easily be
observed.
When applying the judicial balancing process, however, the
circuits generally have failed to raise the issue of relative weights
256.

National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989).

257. The D.C. Circuit in National Federation of Federal Employees v. Cheney, 884
F.2d 603, 608 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 864 (1989), was the only circuit to
expressly acknowledge that Skinner used a distinct set of criteria to adjudicate the constitutionality of the railroad's drug testing program.
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to be assigned the competing governmental and privacy interests.25
The Fifth Circuit suggested in dicta that suspicionless searches may
proceed only when the government has a compelling interest, and
the testing entails a minimal privacy intrusion.259 The Seventh
Circuit raised the issue but was not inclined to assign a compelling
weight to the governmental interest, fearing that doing so would
make the balancing examination meaningless. 216 Instead, it suggested a "valid" or "substantial" interest could justify suspicionless testing when the privacy intrusion was minimal. 6
Characterization of the governmental interest necessary to support
a minimal intrusion accompanying a suspicionless search as "valid"
rather than "compelling" arguably permits use of suspicionless
drug testing to further such broad governmental interests as efficiency, productivity, and even enhanced morale. However, the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Skinner and Von Raab suggests
suspicionless drug testing is constitutionally acceptable only when
governmental interests vital to the public interest, public safety,
or national security are at risk.
The Seventh Circuit's assessment of the weight of the governmental interest necessary to support suspicionless testing raises
another issue. Presumably an "invalid" governmental interest would
not support a search or intrusion-even if supported by probable
cause. The Seventh Circuit's suggestion that a "valid" interest is
sufficient, therefore, lowers the threshold of governmental interest
required to support suspicionless testing. This lower threshold could
become any legitimate interest.
B. The Case for an Exacting Judicial Scrutiny of Drug Testing
Programs that Endorse Suspicionless Searches
The observations and comments in this Article suggest that the
trend, as reflected in federal circuit courts of appeals' decisions,
is to engage in a relaxed scrutiny of governmental drug testing
programs-even programs using suspicionless searches. 262 However,
both the Skinner and Von Raab rationales suggest that courts
should engage in exacting scrutiny when adjudicating the constitutionality of suspicionless searches. In drug testing cases involving

258. But see National Treasury Employees Union v. Bush, 891 F.2d 99, 101 (5th Cir.
1989); Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d. 1189, 1195 n.8 (7th Cir. 1989).
259. Bush, 891 F.2d. at 101.
260. Taylor, 888 F.2d. at 1195 n.8 (7th Cir. 1989).
261. Id.
262. For a recent example of judicial philosophy suggesting that a relaxation in judicial
scrutiny is appropriate, see Wilner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

HeinOnline -- 40 U. Kan. L. Rev. 775 1991-1992

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

suspicionless searches, just as in other cases using a heightened
scrutiny standard, courts should require the government to demonstrate that the testing policies are finely tuned to address im26
portant or compelling governmental concerns.

Governmental policies using suspicionless searches are likely to
increase. Recent efforts on the part of some members of Congress,
if successful, would extend suspicionless drug testing policies to
all federal employees. 264 Concerns regarding the transmission of
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus which has been identified as
the cause of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), have
resulted in repeated calls for suspicionless compulsory testing of
numerous classes of individuals. 265 Thus, it is likely that governmental testing policies involving more substantially intrusive suspicionless personal searches than those associated with drug testing
will surface. In addition, these suspicionless searches will impact
broader classes of individuals than government employees.
V.

CONCLUSION

Suspicionless searches are far removed from traditional principles
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence-principles that historically
have based the reasonableness of a governmental search on the
presence of individualized suspicion and the necessity of undertaking the search to advance some important governmental concern.
Accordingly, we should expect a careful, rather than a casual,
judicial review of their constitutionality. Skinner and Von Raab
are useful to courts facing the task of determining the constitutionality of drug testing programs. However, the federal courts of
appeals have interpreted these opinions as if they represent a
general endorsement of minimal judicial review. The Supreme
Court should dispel this belief.

263. Cf. Coffin, supra note 17, at 26-27 (discussing different levels of judicial scrutiny
applied within the context of judicial balancing).
264. See Federal Agency Drug Testing, 6 Ind. Empl. Rts. Rep. (BNA), June 4, 1991,
No. 11 at 4 (discussing efforts on the part of various members of Congress to extend drug
testing policies to federal personnel at all levels of government).
265. See Steven Eisenstat, An Analysis of the Rationality of Mandatory Testing for the
HIV Antibody: Balancing the Government Public Health Interests with the Individual's
Privacy Interest, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 327, 337-38 (1991) (discussing proposals for compulsory testing of marriage license applicants, prisoners, individuals arrested or convicted
of a sexual or drug related crime, children in state custody, hospital patients, hospital
employees, immigrants, residents, employees of mental health facilities, and members of
the armed forces).
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